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Abstract
I study a game where two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status quo.
For their agreement to come into e¤ect, they need the approval of a third agent. The
preferences of this third agent is private information, but there is communication among
agents. I study this game in the context of international agreements to provide an
explanation for involuntary ratication failures. I show that under certain assumptions,
the informational deciency is incurable due to incentives to misrepresent preferences,
and that a parliament whose majority is more hawkish than their executive prefers the
executive to be risk averse.
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1 Introduction
On March 1st, 2003, the Turkish parliament voted to turn down a military cooperation
agreement with the United States. The agreement would have enabled the US military
to deploy 62000 American troops through southeastern Turkey to open a northern front
against Saddam Hussein (Yetkin 2004; Lee 2003). But, it turned out that the Turkish
executives brought home a deal that was not good enough for the majority in the parliament.
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It included, among other things, too many American troops, too few guarantees about
the future status of Iraqi Kurds, too little nancial compensation for expected economic
losses...(Pan 2003). The ratication failure aroused anger on the U.S. side. It caused the
Bush administration to alter its war plans signicantly at the last minute and according
to some commentators, made the whole campaign a lot more costly (Pan 2003). On the
Turkish side, the executive branch of the government was trying to minimize the damage by
entertaining talks of resubmitting the deal to the parliament. In any case, the damage was
done and nobody wanted to be in the shoes of the Turkish prime minister then.
Interestingly, this was not the rst time that an agreement between the Turkish and
American administrations failed to attract legislative support. The very rst agreement
signed between the two states su¤ered the same fate as well. On August 6, 1923, the
American and Turkish representatives at the Lausanne Conference in Switzerland signed a
Treaty of Amity and Commerce to establish normal diplomatic and commercial relations
between the United States and the newly founded Turkish Republic. Unfortunately, the
treaty failed ratication in the Senate. A majority of senators thought the State Department
had failed to get enough concessions from the Turkish government, especially in terms of
allowances for American intervention for the protection of the Christian minority in Turkey
(Vander Lippe 1993).
Aside from both being interesting anecdotes from the history of Turkish-American re-
lations, these two ratication failures share another interesting feature: they were both
involuntary defections (Putnam 1988). In other words, the executives who signed these
agreements had to involuntarily and unexpectedly defect from the agreements when their
parliaments failed to ratify them. The failure of the 1923 agreement was unexpected because
no one thought a simple amity treaty with a newly formed republic 10000 miles away from
the United States to be an issue of contention in the Senate. The second failure 80 years
later was even more unexpected (Bölükbas¸¬2008; Robins 2003; Rubin 2005; Kapsis 2006;
Hale 2007; Yetkin 2004; Mango 2003). So much so that Turkish ports had already been pre-
pared to receive massive military deployments, and American military ships carrying 35000
American soldiers were already waiting for deployment o¤ the Eastern Mediterranean coasts
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of Turkey (Yetkin 2004).1
History o¤ers us other examples of involuntary defections as well. The Danish prime
minister Poul Schlüter was not expecting the Single European Act to fail parliamentary
ratication. But it did. And when the Danish parliament rejected the Act in 1986, he
had to call for a referendum to save his minority government from falling (Worre 1988). In
1954, the French executives risked a similar humiliation but they maneuvered to withdraw
the European Defence Community Treaty from the parliamentary agenda when it became
obvious that it was destined for a ratication failure (Miller and Rosendorf 1997a; Van
der Veen 2009). Similarly, the Clinton administration tried, and failed, to postpone the
Senate ratication of the Nuclear Weapons Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999, when
it became clear during the Committee hearings that the treaty was short of the votes needed
for approval. And in a most dramatic case, President Wilson believed that the Senate was
bound to ratify the Versailles Treaty because he did not believe the Senate would dare
incur the odium of committing so dastardly a crime against humanity(Bailey 1947). And
when he realized how mistaken he had been, he went on a 8000 mile tour of the country
and worked so hard that he su¤ered a stroke trying to convince the public and, through the
public, the isolationist senators who found the Versailles Treaty too interventionist, that the
treaty was in the best interests of the American nation (Bailey 1947). Despite all his e¤orts,
the Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty.
Involuntary defections are puzzling events. They are puzzling because the executive
negotiating the agreement in the rst place is expected to know and represent the preferences
of her legislature, and bring home an agreement that would be ratied with no problem. Or
conversely, the legislature is expected to exercise enough inuence over the executive to
eliminate the possibility that she would say yes to a domestically unpalatable deal. It is
also politically damaging for a political leader to present to its parliament an international
agreement only to nd that the majority does not nd it in the best interest of the nation.
1Shortly before the ratication the Turkish parliament passed a resolution to allow the arrival of American
advance guards to modernize Turkish airports and seaports in preparation for massive military deployments.
The head of the Turkish negotiating team, Ambassador Deniz Bölükbas¸¬, who later collected his memoirs
in a book (Bölükbas¸¬2008), explains in detail how the passage of this rst resolution on February 6, 2003,
misled both sides by creating false expectations.
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But the failures I have discussed so far clearly demonstrate that executives may indeed lack
information about domestic preferences. What is even more interesting is that executives
can have these deciencies despite all the communication that goes on between them and
their legislatures.
In this paper, I develop and study a formal model of ratication to further our under-
standing of involuntary defections. I start by arguing that an executive may su¤er from
uncertainty about domestic preferences, and I examine the conditions under which her un-
certainty remains unresolved even in the presence of communication, leading to a ratication
failure.2 Having said that, I must emphasize that my model does not predict ratication
failures in all cases where the executive lacks information about domestic preferences. It
only points out the possibility and demonstrates that communication does not reduce the
probability of such an outcome. In that sense, the model is applicable to all international
negotiations conducted by executives with less than perfect information about domestic
preferences. Evans (1993) argues that such circumstances are more common than expected:
Our mistake was not in overestimating the importance of information: it was
in overestimating the informational consequences of national boundaries. Chief of
governmentsestimates of what was ratiable in their own domestic politics were
often wrong ... the quality of information within domestic boundaries was lower
than we had expected. Estimates from the other side of the international table
are not always accurate but there is no evidence in our cases that negotiators
estimates about their own domestic tables are substantially more accurate.
Given that the domestic executive is to work under uncertainty, her attitude towards risk
becomes important. In this paper, I also inquire whether leaders that di¤er in terms of their
2The informational deciency might stem from di¤erent reasons. It might, for example, be that the
executive is imperfectly informed about the costs alternative agreements will impose on the constituencies of
the legislators while legislators are perfectly informed about them. If a legislators stance towards alternative
agreements depends on the costs the agreement imposes on his constituency then uncertainty about these
costs translates into uncertainty about legislative preferences. I thank the associate editor for bringing to
my attention that President Clinton might have su¤ered such an informational deciency while signing the
Kyoto Protocol, and that he might have underestimated the burden that would be imposed on Americas
businesses and taxpayers in complying with the agreement.
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attitudes towards risk fare di¤erently in managing international negotiations under domestic
uncertainty. The signing of an international agreement that gets the national stamp of
approval is a political success for a leader. Thus, this paper examines whether some leaders,
due to their attitudes towards risk, are more likely to be successful than others in conducting
foreign policy when they have to work with limited information about domestic preferences.
It is a well-established result in the bargaining literature that there is an inverse relation
between the degree of risk aversion of a player and her gains from a bargain (see for example,
Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler 1981).3 In our context, this negative relation between risk
aversion and bargaining gains implies that a more risk averse executive is expected to do
worse at the international table. Thus, in a scenario where she had full information about
domestic politics, a risk averse executive would not be an ideal representative of the national
interest. Interestingly, I nd that an opposite result holds under incomplete information. A
legislature whose majority is more hawkish than the executive towards cooperation with the
foreign country prefers the executive to be risk averse rather than risk neutral. Moreover,
the more hawkish the legislators the more risk averse they prefer the executive to be.
There are similar bargaining subject to veto by a third agent situations in various other
economic and political areas, which provide further applicability for my model. One such
area is domestic veto-bargaining in presidential bicameral systems where the president holds
a veto over proposed legislation by the chambers. To adopt my model one needs only to
think of the bargainers as legislative chambers bargaining on an alternative policy to replace
the status quo, and the ratier as the president. There is an extensively rich literature
on veto bargaining between a president and her legislature (for a detailed review of this
literature please see Cameron and McCarty 2004, and Cameron 2000). And the literature
3For example, previous research has shown that more risk averse workers are at a disadvantage when
bargaining over wages (Pissarides 1974; Feinberg, 1977). Empirical support for this result often has been
found in the observed wage di¤erentials between men and women. While a large portion of this wage gap
can be explained by factors that are thought to be correlated with productivity, a substantial portion of the
wage gap remains unexplained (Bayard et.al. 1999; Light and Ureta 1995; Polachek and Kim 1994; Becker
and Lindsay 1995), and researchers tie this unexplained gap to the di¤erences between men and women in
terms of their risk aversion (Vesterlund 1997) as women are found to be more risk averse than men (Eckel
and Grossman 2008; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1996).
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contains some very inuential works which have argued before that proposers of legislation
may lack information about presidential preferences, and that this deciency might explain
presidential vetoes (Cameron 2000; McCarty 1997; Matthews 1989). Interestingly, most
veto-bargaining studies treat the legislature as unicameral. For their results to be applicable
to bicameral systems it must either be that (i) the chambers are congruent in terms of their
policy preferences, or that (ii) one of them lacks enough leverage to keep the other from
acting unilaterally. However, Heller (2007) argues that congruence should be rare as it is
highly unlikely to have di¤erent chambers with identical preferences as long as legislative
chambers are made up of di¤erent sets of individuals (for a detailed survey of the literature
on bicameralism please see Heller 2007). Also, condition (ii) fails as long as each chamber
has at the very least a veto over policy. Moreover, Tsebelis and Money (1997) show that
even the ability to delay legislation should yield tangible policy inuence. My model o¤ers a
way to incorporate bicameralism into studies of veto-bargaining in domestic policy making.
It acknowledges that in bicameral systems the proposed legislation is itself an outcome of an
initial intercameral bargain. My results then point to the possibility of presidential vetoes in
cases where the chambers have uncertainty about policy preferences of the president. More
importantly, we know that the possibility cannot be abated through communication between
the chambers and the president.
My analysis is also applicable to delegated bargaining situations in which an agent con-
ducts a bargain on behalf of a principal. Attorneys, for example, conduct pre-trial bargains
on behalf of their clients who reserve the right to reject the outcome of the bargain. Litigation
models usually analyze the litigation process as a two-player strategic game of incomplete
information between the plainti¤ and the defendant, and leave out attorneys as players be-
cause they assume attorneys and their clients have the same objectives. However, Watts
(1994) argues that an attorney paid by contingency fee may want to settle a case, even
when it is not advantageous to her client, in order to avoid the cost of preparing for trial.
And plainti¤ lawyers are mostly paid by contingency contracts whereas defendant lawyers
are typically paid at hourly rates (Trubek et al. 1983; Cai 2000). Hence, pre-trial negotia-
tions can better be depicted as a bargain between the plainti¤s attorney and the defendant
(or his attorney), a bargain whose outcome is subject to approval by the plainti¤.
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Similarly, company executives conduct merger and acquisition bargains on behalf of their
shareholders who, by law, have to approve the nal deal. Stories of failed merger deals (which
usually end with the executive losing her job) indicate that executives may sometimes fail
to anticipate shareholder preferences.4 My analysis can also be a used to better understand
such interactions.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I discuss the related literature, and
how this paper contributes to it. In Section 3, I develop the ratication game. In Section
4, I characterize the equilibria of the game. Finally, I conclude in Section 5 by discussing
how my results further our understanding of the questions that have motivated the paper.
2 The literature
This paper contributes to the linkage politics literature which studies the interactions be-
tween domestic and foreign politics. Starting with Putnams ground breaking work, the
linkage politics literature has relied on the notion of a two-levelgame in which an execu-
tive is to thread between the domestic politics game table and the international politics game
table (Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993; Iida 1993; Iida 1996; Mo 1994; Mo 1995; Milner and
Rosendorf 1997a,b; Reinhardt 1996). This two-simultaneously-played-games structure in-
cludes three players; the foreign executive, the domestic executive, and the domestic ratier.
The executives negotiate an agreement which is then subject to ratication by the domestic
ratier. The linkage-politics literature acknowledges various informational asymmetries that
may exist among players. The foreign executive may lack information about the preferences
of the domestic ratier (Mo 1994). Alternatively, the domestic ratier may lack informa-
tion about the preferences of the foreign and/or domestic executive (Iida 1993; Milner and
Rosendorf 1997b).
Iida (1996), Milner and Rosendorf (1997a) and Reinhardt (1996) explore a third possi-
bility, namely that the domestic executive may lack information about the preferences of the
4See for example, the 2001 merger between HP and Compaq which almost failed when some important
shareholders did not like the deal the CEOs agreed upon (The Michigan Daily, Sept.5, 2001). The failed
GM-Magna deal is another example (The Wall Street Journal, Nov.4, 2009).
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domestic ratier. Iida demonstrates that an executive with such an informational deciency
risks involuntary defection. He incorporates communication in his model, however, he does
not allow strategic misrepresentation. Milner and Rosendorf (1997a) point to elections that
take place after the negotiation but before the ratication of an international agreement as
a possible explanation for how an executive can lack ratiability information and end up
with a ratication failure in her hands. Their model does not allow any kind of communi-
cation between the executive and the ratier since elections change the composition of the
parliament, and thus render any pre-negotiation communication useless. Reinhardt (1996)
empirically tests the relationship between certain domestic institutional sources of uncer-
tainty and international bargaining outcomes using a database of trade disputes conducted
under the purview of the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT).
In this paper I follow Iida (1996), Milner and Rosendorf (1997a), and Reinhardt (1996),
and start with the argument that an executive may lack information about domestic pref-
erences. I then take an additional step and argue that the informational deciency cannot
be an explanation to involuntary defection by itself since in most cases the executive has
the opportunity to communicate with the ratier to cure her deciency. Consequently, my
model incorporates communication between the ratier and the executive. My model di¤ers
from Milner and Rosendorfs since I keep the players xed throughout the game, which,
consequently, makes communication possible. My analysis also extends Iidas work by allow-
ing strategic misrepresentation and by demonstrating how it can render all communication
ine¤ective.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the strategic transmission of private
information via cheap-talk (for a detailed survey of the literature please see Ganguly and Ray
2006). My model is a variant of the canonical model for strategic cheap talk communication
by Crawford and Sobel (1982). In their path-breaking work, Crawford and Sobel develop a
model of strategic communication between a sender with private information and a receiver
who after observing the message takes an action that determines the welfare of both. The
authors demonstrate that under standard assumptions, equilibrium communications always
take a certain form in which the sender partitions the support of the variable that represents
his private information and reports only which element of the partition his information
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actually lies in. Crawford and Sobel argue that the equilibrium whose partition has the
greatest number of elements is a reasonable one for agents to coordinate on as it is Pareto-
superior to all other equilibria (before the sender observes his private information). In this
paper, I identify the conditions under which the only equilibrium partition is the support
set itself, and thus there is no information transmission. This paper is also closely related
to Matthews (1989), who extends the Crawford-Sobel model and studies veto-bargaining
in domestic policy making via a three-stage signaling game in which he has two players: a
policymaker, who proposes a new policy to replace an existing one, and a ratier, who chooses
between the proposed and the existing policy. The preferences of the ratier are private
information. Matthews shows that in equilibrium communication transmits only a very
limited amount of information between the ratier and the policymaker, which means that
the proposed policy runs the risk of being rejected by the ratier. I extend Matthewsmodel
and show that, under certain assumptions a stronger result holds, namely that in equilibrium,
information transmission between the policy maker and the ratier is not possible.
3 The ratication game
Two countries bargain on an international cooperation agreement to replace the existing
state of a¤airs between them. The international bargain is conducted by executives from
the two countries. For the result of their bargain to come into e¤ect, it must be ratied
by the legislatures of both countries. Ratication requires that at least a certain number of
legislators approve the international agreement (e.g., the United States Constitution assigns
the power to ratify treaties to the Senate, and ratication requires approval by two-thirds
of the Senate). One of the executives knows for sure that she has enough legislative support
at home backing her bargaining position. Whereas the other executive is not as lucky and
cannot rely on party votes either because her party does not have enough seats (for example,
it is extraordinarily rare for one political party to control two-thirds of the Senates seats) or
because there is a faction within her party that opposes cooperation with the other country.
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Thus she needs the votes of another group in the parliament.56 This group might be an
opposition party, a faction within the executives party, or a cross-party coalition of legislators
who share similar views on cooperation with the foreign country. But she lacks information
about that groups preferences. There is communication between the executive and the group
of legislators. All communications are public, thus any information the executive gathers is
available to her counterpart at the international negotiation table as well. Below, I model
the above interaction as a signaling game.
The game has three players: the foreign executive, denoted by F, the domestic
executive, denoted byD, and a domestic ratier,7 denoted by P. The policy space is one-
dimensional and is represented by the real line <: The players have symmetric, single-peaked
preferences on <. In other words, each has an ideal policy on <, and each prefers a policy
closer to her ideal than a policy that is farther away.8 Let f; d; t 2 < be the ideal policies
of the foreign executive, the domestic executive, and the domestic ratier respectively. And
let the following payo¤ functions represent the preferences of the players in the same order:
UF (a) =   ja  f j
5Admitedly, such scenarios would be more probable in presidential-like systems, in parliamentary mi-
nority systems like the Nordic countries, or, in parliamentary majority systems where the ruling party has
weak discipline. For a detailed discussion of the e¤ects of institutional setup on domestic uncertainty in
international negotiation settings please see Reinhardt (1996).
6There may of course be multiple groups in the parliamanent with whom the executive can try to build a
coalition. But communication with multiple agents is out of the scope of this article. So, I assume that there
is only one group with whom the executive can form a ratication coalition. This is equivalent to assuming
that in a setup with multiple groups available for coalition, the executive knows which one is the pivotal
group.
7For treaties which require a simple majority for ratication the domestic ratier corresponds to the
median legislator. Some treaties require a super-majority (like two-thirds) for ratication. This merely
changes the identity of the decisive legislator; the analysis is unchanged. I thank the associate editor for
bringing this point to my attention.
8Note that this preference structure does not impose any restrictions on the motivations of legislators. For
a policy oriented legislator, for example, his ideal policy would simply reect his ideologically most preferred
policy, whereas for an o¢ ce or vote oriented legislator, his ideal policy would reect the most preferred policy
of his constituency.
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for the foreign executive,
UD(a) =   ja  djk
for the domestic executive, where k 2 <, and k  1; k determines the domestic executives
attitude towards risk. As k increases D becomes more risk averse. And nally,
UP (a; t) =   ja  tj
for the domestic ratier, where a 2 <. In other words, the payo¤ that a player gets from a
policy a 2 < depends on the distance between the ideal policy of the player and a:
The ideal policies of the executives, that is, f and d; are common knowledge. Without loss
of generality, assume f < d: The ideal policy of the domestic ratier P however, is private
information to P . That is, F and D do not know the exact value of t. They, however,
know that it is a random variable with distribution function G; and density function g, with
domain T  < . I assume that G(d) = 0, which means that P is more hawkish in its stance
towards F than D is. G is common knowledge. I will simply refer to t as Ps type, and T
as the type space.
There is a status quo policy, q 2 <, in place. If F and D can agree on a new policy
and get P to vote for their agreement, they can replace the status quo with this new policy
they agreed upon.
The game has three stages:
(i) At stage one, P observes its type which is a draw by Nature from its distribution,
and makes a declaration about it by sending a message m(t) 2 M; where M is the set
of messages P can send. If, for example, P chooses to truthfully reveal her type, then
her message will be m(t) = t: But, note that the ratier can always choose to strategically
misrepresent her type. The ratiers declaration strategy is then a function p : T  !
4(M) that maps the true preferred policy of P to a probability distribution on the set of
messages. p(m; t) then denotes the probability that P will send the message m given that
its ideal policy is t.
(ii) At stage two D and F bargain on a new policy to replace the status quo q using
the information they get from P 0s message m. Let (a;m) denote F and Ds common
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belief about the probability of ratication of an agreement a given that P has sent the
message m at stage one. Note that F and D should have the same belief since they are
exposed to the same information. I use the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, 1950) to model
the international negotiation which means the result of the international bargain solves the
following maximization problem,
max
a2<
(a;m)2[UD(a)  UD(q)][UF (a)  UF (q)] (1)9
There may be multiple agreements that maximize the objective function in (1): I assume
that there is a commonly known protocol in place that determines the resulting agreement
in such cases. It will be clear in the following sections that my results do not depend on
the choice of a specic protocol, so any protocol is acceptable as long as it clearly states out
a selection rule among Nash Bargaining solutions. Let N : M =) < be a correspondence
that gives for each message the associated Nash Bargaining outcomes of the international
negotiation. And let  : M ! < be a renement of the correspondence N that for each m
maps N(m) to (m) 2 N (m), the resulting agreement of the international negotiation when
P sends the message m.
(iii) At stage three, P makes a choice between the agreement (m) that D and F reach
at stage two and the status quo policy q. If P chooses the agreement over the status quo, the
agreement replaces the status quo, if not, the status quo prevails. The ratiers ratication
strategy is then a function v : < ! f0; 1g that maps each policy proposal to a ratication
decision. P accepts an agreement a if v(a) = 1, and rejects if v(a) = 0:
A strategy for P is then a pair (p; v) where (i) p : T  ! 4(M) is a declaration strategy,
and (ii) v : < ! f0; 1g is a ratication strategy. Given p, v, and , say a type t sends
message m if p(m; t) > 0. Message m induces agreement a if (m) = a: Similarly, a
is induced by type t if it is induced by a message sent by type t.
Let the status quo policy be such that f < d < q: Note that the other cases are trivial
and uninteresting for the purposes of our analysis. For q < f , the Nash bargain results in
f , which F and D know is ratiable since it is closer to all possible types of P than q is.10
9Derived from the following maximization problem:
max
a2<
[(a;m)UD(a) + (1  (a;m))UD(q)  UD(q)][(a;m)UF (a) + (1  (a;m))UF (q)  UF (q)]
10For k = 1, the Nash bargain results in f whenever q  f , and in q whenever f < q < d: Kihlstrom, Roth
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For f  q  d, there is no room for international cooperation since there is no alternative
policy that F and D both prefer to the status quo. Only when d < q; does Ps type become
important for F and D.
Finally, I assume that t is uniformly distributed over T; and that T = [d; q]. In other
words, I limit T to only those types that are more hawkish in their stance towards F than D
is, but nonetheless, are not against cooperation with F: It can easily be shown that all the
results that I derive in the following sections remain valid under a uniform type distribution
over an interval that also includes types that are against cooperation with F (that is, T can
be extended to some [d; r], where r > q). But, this extension only brings further notational
complication without changing the results. So, I limit the type space to [d; q]. This limitation
enables us to see whether D and P can communicate to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the
danger of ratication failure when it is common knowledge that both support cooperation
with F . Without loss of generality, normalize f =  1; d = 0, and q = 1: Hence, T = [0; 1].
Denition 2 An equilibrium in the above game is, i) a strategy couple (p; v); for P ,
composed of a declaration strategy and a ratication strategy; ii) a function  that maps
each received message to an international agreement; and a belief  held by the domestic
and the foreign executives about ratiability of alternative agreements where
1)For all t 2 [0; 1]; R
M
p(m; t)dm = 1 and if m is in the support of p(:; t) then m solves
max
m2M
  j(m)  tj
2)For all t 2 [0; 1];
v(a; t) =

1 if ja  tj  jq   tj
0 if otherwise
3)For all m 2M; (m) 2 [f; q]; and (m) 2 N(m), that is, (m) solves
and Schmeidler prove that the utility which Nashs solution assigns to a player increases as his opponent
becomes more risk averse(Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler, 1981, p.67). Then, as k increases, the Nash
bargaining should result in an agreement that would give F a higher utility than she would get if she were
to bargain with a risk neutral D. This implies that as k increases, there would be no change in the Nash
bargaining solution while q  d regardless of how risk averse the domestic executive is. For q > d; Kihlstrom,
Roth and Schmeidlers result implies that for k > 1, the international negotiation would yield an agreement
a such that f  a < d.
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max
a2<
[(a;m)]2[UD(a)  UD(q)][UF (a)  UF (q)] (1)
where (a;m) is the conditional probability that a will be accepted.
4) For all m 2M such that p(m; t) > 0 for some t 2 [d; q], (a;m); satises
(a;m) =
qR
d
v(a; t)p(m; t)g(t)dt
qR
d
p(m; t)g(t)dt
:
The rst item in the equilibrium denition requires that Ps declaration strategy is a best
response to . The second item requires P to vote yes for an agreement that it weakly prefers
to the status quo. The third item requires that the outcome of the international negotiation
should be a solution to the Nash Bargain between F and D; and if multiple solutions exist,
the solution agreed-to must be agreed upon in accordance with the prespecied, commonly
known international protocol. Finally, the fourth item in the equilibrium denition requires
that, based on the equilibrium declaration of P , players F and D revise their prior belief
about t via Bayesian updating. What is important here is that, for any message that has
a positive probability of being sent in equilibrium, the revised belief of F and D following
that message should be consistent with the declaration strategy of P . If, for example, Ps
equilibrium declaration strategy is to declare twice its ideal policy, the revised belief should
assign probability one to t = m

2
.
4 Equilibria
In this section I conduct an equilibrium analysis of the ratication game. In any equilibrium,
my main point of interest is the amount of information transmission accomplished in that
equilibrium. I try to see if the game has equilibria in which communication resolves or
attenuates the informational deciency of the domestic executive, and thus eliminates or
mitigates the risk of ratication failure. I dene the size of an equilibrium as the number
of induced agreements in that equilibrium, and classify the equilibria of the ratication
game accordingly. The analysis below shows that the ratication game has only size one
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equilibria. Moreover, in any size one equilibria, the induced agreement is the same agreement
that would be induced by a completely uninformative declaration strategy. In other words,
the ratication game has no equilibrium in which P can convey any information about
its preferences to D and F by communication. This result demonstrates how domestic
uncertainty can lead to ratication failure. Given that only the same specic agreement
can be induced in any equilibrium, I then set out to see how that agreement and the risk of
ratication failure it carries change as the domestic executives attitude towards risk changes.
It turns out that as the domestic executive becomes more risk averse, the induced equilibrium
agreement shifts towards the status quo and thus, the risk of ratication failure it carries
decreases.
A simple kind of equilibrium that always exists in signaling games is a babbling equi-
librium in which all types of the message sender send the same message with the same
probability rendering the declaration strategy completely uninformative. A babbling dec-
laration strategy is also called a fully pooling strategy since all types pool on one
probability distribution over the message set. In my model, the following declaration strat-
egy, for example, would be a babbling one:
p(m; t) = p(m; t0) > 0 for all t; t0 2 [d; q] and for all m 2M
Similarly,
p(m; t) =

1 if m = m0
0 if m 6= m0
is a babbling declaration strategy. Given that the message received is uninformative the
receiver of the message then acts on her prior belief as she has not received any new infor-
mation.
In a babbling equilibrium then, P employs a fully pooling declaration strategy in which
all types send the same message with the same probability. And since the message is un-
informative about t, F and D rely on their prior beliefs in conducting the international
negotiations. Since messages are being ignored, it is a best response for P to babble.
Proposition 1 The ratication game has babbling equilibria in which the domestic ratier
employs an uninformative, babbling declaration strategy, and the international negotiation
results in the agreement abab 2 [d; q):
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Proof. Please see Appendix A.
Note that the ratication game has multiple babbling equilibria since there are multiple
babbling strategies P can employ. But all babbling equilibria have the same induced agree-
ment. Since the declaration strategy is uninformative, D and F bargain based on their prior
belief (that t is uniformly distributed on [d; q]). Thus, all babbling declaration strategies lead
to the same Nash bargaining equation (which also has a unique maximizer), and thus, to the
same agreement. And since there is only one induced agreement in a babbling equilibrium,
all babbling equilibria are size one.
Proposition 2 When D is risk neutral the induced agreement in a babbling equilibrium,
abab; corresponds to Ds ideal agreement d, but as she becomes more and more risk averse
abab moves towards the status-quo away from the ideal agreements of both F and D. Since F
and D are incompletely informed about the preferences of P , there is a possibility that abab
will be voted down, but that possibility decreases as D becomes more risk averse.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
A babbling declaration strategy does not resolve the uncertainty about domestic prefer-
ences, and thus, the induced agreement faces the risk of ratication failure. Interestingly,
that risk is negatively related to the risk aversion of the domestic executive. In other words,
an international agreement that is signed by a risk averse leader who lacks information about
domestic preferences is less prone to ratication failure than an agreement that she would
have signed if she had been less risk averse.
Remark 1 The induced agreement in any size one equilibria of the ratication game is the
agreement induced in a babbling equilibrium.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
What is of more interest is whether the ratication game has any equilibrium in which
P is able to convey some information about its preferences.
Proposition 3 The ratication game has no fully separating equilibrium. Thus, full in-
formation transmission is not possible.
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Proof. A fully separating equilibrium requires P to employ a declaration strategy
that would reveal its type by sending a di¤erent message for each possible type (hence the
declaration strategy separateseach type from another). Given an equilibrium message m
then, F and D can solve for p 1(m) = t. With p invertible, (a;m) should be as follows;
(a;m) =

1 if a  2p 1(m)  q
0 otherwise
where t = p 1(m): The result of the Nash Bargain, (m); then solves
max
a2[f;q]
(1  jajk) (1  a) subject to 2p 1(m)  q  a (2)
Note that the objective function in (2) cannot have a maximizer in (d; q], and that it is
strictly decreasing in <+ which implies that any maximizer it has in [f; q] must be in [f; d].
Thus, for t > d+q
2
; a fully separating declaration strategy induces 2t  q as the international
agreement. But this cannot be an equilibrium because any type t with t > d+q
2
can increase
its payo¤ simply by sending the message of type t+q
2
.
The ratication game has no fully separating equilibrium which means that communi-
cation cannot get rid of uncertainty completely. The most we can hope for now is partial
information transmission. Note that with full information transmission ruled out, we know
that in equilibrium, we cannot get rid of the risk of ratication failure. The question now
is whether we can have some communication in equilibrium that would mitigate that risk.
The following results demonstrate that we cannot.
Proposition 4 In any equilibrium, there can be at most one induced agreement in the (d; q)
interval.
Proof. Suppose two distinct agreements x; y 2 (d; q) are both induced in some equilibrium.
Without loss of generality, assume x < y: Since (m) is by denition unique for each m;
it must be that x and y are induced by di¤erent messages. Let t0 = x+y
2
. Then UP (x; t0) =
UP (y; t
0). Moreover, for each t > t0, Up(x; t) < Up(y; t). Thus, a type t > t0 never sends
a message that induces x: So, when F and D receive a message that they respond to by
agreeing on x they know that the message comes from a type in [d; t0]: Note that, since x < q
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and y < q, it must be that UP (x; t0) > UP (q; t0). Thus, by continuity of UP (:; t); type t0
would accept an agreement slightly to the left of x with probability one and so does any
type t < t0: But then we have a contradiction since agreeing on x cannot be optimal for F
and D when they receive the message m: They can both increase their utilities by agreeing
on something slightly to the left of x:
We know by incentive compatibility that, in equilibrium, there cannot be an induced
agreement outside [f; q]. Proposition 4, facilitates our search further by demonstrating that
in any equilibrium, there can only be one induced agreement in (d; q):
Proposition 5 In any equilibrium, there can be at most one induced agreement in the [f; d]
interval.
Proof. First note that for any received message m 2 M , (m) is unique by construction.
Thus, if there exists multiple induced agreements in the [f; d] interval in an equilibrium,
it must be that each is induced by a di¤erent message. Take any two induced agreements
x; y 2 [f; d] and without loss of generality let y < x: Since I have restricted the type space
to the [0; 1] interval, it must be that all types strictly prefer x to y. But then no type sends
the message that induces y: Hence, we have a contradiction.
Proposition 4 and 5 together cover almost the whole set of incentive compatible agreements:
I have only one other possible agreement that can be induced in an equilibrium, and that is
the status quo itself;
Proposition 6 The ratication game has no equilibrium in which the status quo is an in-
duced agreement. In other words, there is no equilibrium in which, based on the message that
P sends, F and D agree on q:
Proof. We know, by Proposition 1, that q is not the induced agreement in a babbling
equilibrium. Thus, q can only be an induced agreement in an equilibrium in which there is
at least one other induced agreement x 2 [f; q). By Proposition 4, we know that there can be
at most one other induced agreement in (d; q): By Proposition 5, we know that there can be at
most one other induced agreement in [f; d]. (Note that an induced agreement in equilibrium
cannot be to the right of q since it is not individually rational for F and D to agree on
18
anything that is worse for them than the status quo.) Let x be the maximum of the other
induced agreements in equilibrium. Let t0 = x+q
2
: Then, it must be that UP (x; t0) = UP (q; t0):
Moreover, for each t < t0, it must be that UP (x; t) > UP (q; t). Thus, a type t < t0 would never
send a message that induces q. Similarly, for each t > t0, it must be that UP (x; t) < UP (q; t).
Thus, a type t > t0 would never send a message that induces x; nor a message that induces
anything to the left of x for that matter. Thus, when F and D receive a message that they
respond to by agreeing on q, they know that the message must have come from a type t 
t0. Take any y 2 (t0; q). All types in [t0; y+q
2
] strictly prefer y to q. And, since for all t 2 [d; q];R
M
p(m; t)dm = 1; there must be at least one message, say m0; that these types send with
positive probability. Note that when F and D observe a message that is sent by a type in
[t0; y+q
2
] with positive probability, they would be better of agreeing on y than q. Suppose F
and D observe m0: Since all types in [t0; q] induce q, m0 must induce q. But, then we have a
contradiction since with positive probability m0 is coming from a type in [t0; y+q
2
]:
To summarize,
 we know, by incentive compatibility that, all induced agreements in equilibrium must
be in [f; q];
 we know, by Proposition 6 that, q is not an induced agreement in any equilibrium;
 we know, by Proposition 4 that, in any equilibrium, there can be at most one induced
agreement in (d; q);
 we know, by Proposition 5 that, in any equilibrium, there can be at most one induced
agreement in [f; d];
 we know, by Proposition 1, that the ratication game has size one equilibria, and all
size one equilibria have the same induced agreement that is in [d; q):
Thus, we can conclude that the ratication game can have only two types of equilibria:
size one equilibria with abab as the induced agreement and size two equilibria in which there
are two induced agreements, one in [f; d], and one in (d; q): Now, I will investigate and if it
exists, characterize this second type of equilibria.
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An equilibrium with two induced agreements y 2 [f; d];and x 2 (d; q), implies a partition
of the type space into two parts. Let t = x+y
2
. Then a type t would be indi¤erent between
the two agreements. Moreover, for each t < t, t would strictly prefer y to x, and thus would
never send the message(s) that induce x. Similarly, for each t > t, t would strictly prefer x to
y, and thus would never send the message(s) that induce y. Hence, when F and D receive a
message that respond to by agreeing on x (y), they know the message is coming from a type
t  t0 (t  t0). To characterize size two equilibria then, I need to nd out if such equilibrium
partitions of the type space exist. Note that there cannot be an equilibrium partition with
t > 1
2
since that would require both x and y to be in (d; q). We know by Proposition 4 that
there is no such equilibrium.
Take any t 2 (0; 1
2
] and let P send the signal h (high) if t > t and l (low) if t  t:11
Lemma 1 When D and F receive the message l, the international Nash Bargain results in
(l), where f  (l)  d:
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
Now, suppose that the equilibrium message is h; which signals that the ideal policy of P
is above t;
Lemma 2 When D and F receive the message h, the international Nash Bargain results in
(h), where d < (h) < q.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
Now we can summarize the international bargain given that P employs the declaration
strategy p(t) =

l with p(l;t)=1 if tt
h with p(h;t)=1 if tt : The international agreement induced by the mes-
sage l is (l), and the international agreement induced by the message h is (h): For
an equilibrium to exist it must be that P has no incentive to deviate from her signaling
strategy. For P to have no incentive to deviate from the above signaling strategy it must
be that neither a low type nor a high type should have any incentive to mimic the other.
This happens only when each type prefers what its signal brings to what the other signal
11One can use other messages. To facilitate the discussion, I am using a maximal size two pooling strategy
in which all types that induce a particular agreement send the same message.
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would have brought. In other words, for an equilibrium to exist it must be that for some t;
(l)+(h)
2
= t: Note that in such a situation neither a high type nor a low type could get an
agreement closer to its ideal by mimicking the other.
Proposition 7 The ratication game only has size one equilibria. In other words, there is
no equilibrium in which it is possible for the domestic ratier to convey information to the
executive.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
Proposition 7 states that there is no k  1, and t 2 (0; 1), for which (l)+(h)
2
= t:
This means the game has no size two equilibrium and hence we are left with only size one
equilibria with abab as the induced agreement: This result implies that the executives have
to conclude the international negotiations with nothing but their prior beliefs about the
preferences of the domestic legislators. And thus, there is always a risk that the agreement
will fail ratication.
5 Conclusion
International agreements are usually reached at the end of a bargain between the executives
of the countries negotiating the deal, and the agreement comes into e¤ect only after parlia-
mentary ratications. History o¤ers us puzzling examples of involuntary ratication failures
of international agreements, the latest of which is the failed military cooperation agreement
between Turkey and United States. These failures are involuntary because the executives
who signed them had done so with the anticipation that they would pass ratication. They
are puzzling because the executive negotiating the agreement in the rst place is expected
to know and represent the preferences of her legislature, and bring home an agreement that
would be ratied with no problem. Or conversely, the legislature is expected to exercise
enough inuence over the executive to eliminate the possibility that she would say yes to
a domestically unpalatable deal. In this paper, I argue that informational deciencies an
executive may have about domestic legislative preferences can explain this puzzle.
I develop a game in which two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status
quo state of a¤airs between them. For their agreement to come into e¤ect, they need the
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approval of a third agent whose payo¤ is also determined by the prevailing state. The
two bargainers have uncertainty about the preferences of this third agent, but they can
always communicate with her to resolve their uncertainty. I demonstrate that uncertainty
about the preferences of the veto holder may lead the bargainers to shake hands on an
agreement only to see it su¤er a veto. More importantly, I show that communication may
fail to resolve this uncertainty. These results indicate that an executive who su¤ers from
uncertainty about domestic legislative preferences, risks facing a ratication failure despite
all the communication she may have with her legislature.
I model communication as cheap talk which means conveying messages does not carry
any consequential costs on the part of the legislators. The cheap-talk design is preferred over
a costly-signaling one because I believe it better represents the real-life cases that motivate
this article. Legislators actually have a wide variety of actions that can act as signals. They,
for example, can initiate a round of hearings, pass resolutions, vote in straw polls, hold press
conferences, make speeches on the oor, call upon regulatory agencies to tighten enforcement
of existing legislation, or even personally visit the executive. It can be argued that most of
these acts may carry reputational costs, but it is di¢ cult to argue that such reputational
costs would be a distinguishing factor among legislators since that requires these costs to
vary with the preferences of legislators on the outcome of the international negotiation.
While it is true that an involuntary ratication failure can be costly for legislators as well
as the executive, and that legislators would try to avoid such a situation by communicating
their preferences, it seems that the array of signaling devices they have at their disposal are
limited in their ability to carry information (Reinhardt 1996). Nevertheless, there might be
cases for which costly signaling arguments can be made, and thus it is a useful exercise to
consider a costly-signaling version of the model. I conduct this exercise in Appendix C.
Another interesting result my analyses demonstrate is that, with communication channels
devalued, legislators with similar preferences to those of the executive prefer a leader that can
take risks, whereas legislators whose preferences diverge from those of the executive prefer
a more risk averse leader. And in the latter case, the probability of a ratication failure
decreases as the executive becomes more risk-averse.
This study is motivated by some puzzling observations from the international relations
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arena. Nevertheless, the model can easily be adapted to study domestic veto bargaining
situations in presidential bicameral systems where the president holds a veto over proposed
legislation. The results then point to the possibility of presidential vetoes in cases where the
chambers are uncertain about policy preferences of the president. More importantly, that
possibility cannot be abated by communication between the chambers and the president.
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6 Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. At the international negotiation stage, F and D bargain on an
agreement and the outcome of their bargain solves the following maximization;
max
a2[f;q]
[(a;m)]2(UD(a)  UD(q))(UF (a)  UF (q))
When P employs a babbling declaration strategy, she sends an uninformative message. F
and D update their belief via BayesRule which, in this case, results in their prior belief.
Since both executives base their expectations on their shared prior belief about t, (a;m) =
G(a+1
2
); and the above maximization becomes
max
a2[ 1;1]

(1  jajk)

a+ 1
2

1  a2
2

(A2)
For any a 2 (0; 1]; the Nash Bargaining objective function in (A2) evaluated at a yields a
higher value than the same function evaluated at ( a), which implies that I can rewrite (A2)
as
max
a2[0;1]

(1  ak)

a+ 1
2

1  a2
2

(A20)
Let
n1(a) = (1  ak)

a+ 1
2

1  a2
2

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an let b(a) = (1   ak), and c(a) = (a+1
2
)(1 a
2
2
), where k  1. Then, n1(a) = c(a)  b(a).
Note that both b and c are continuous, concave functions. Moreover, c(a) is maximized at
a = 1
3
and b(a) is maximized at a = 0, which implies, in the interval (1
3
; 1] both functions
are decreasing. Thus n1 cannot have a maximum in (13 ; 1]: The rst derivative of n1 is a
continuously decreasing (second derivative is negative for a  1
3
) function and it is positive
at a = 0 and, negative at a = 1
3
which implies there exists a unique maximizer within the
interval [0; 1
3
]:
Proof of Proposition 2. For any message m, (m) solves
max
a2[ 1;1]
(E(UD(a)) + 1)(E(UF (a)) + 2))
where E(U(a)) denotes the expected value of U at a. If an interior solution to this maxi-
mization problem exists, call it a, then it solves the following rst order condition,
(E(U 0F (a
))(E(UD(a)) + 1) + E(U 0D(a
))(E(UF (a)) + 2)) = 0
where
U 0(a) =
@U(a)
@a
Let
Q(a; k) = (E(U 0F (a))(E(UD(a)) + 1) + E(U
0
D(a))(E(UF (a)) + 2))
then,
@a
@k
=  @Q(a; k)=@k
@Q(a; k)=@a
ja=a
=  
"
@E(UD(a))
@k
E(UF 0(a)) + @E(U
0
D(a))
@k
(E(UF (a)) + 2))
@Q(a;k)
@a
#
a=a
Note that the denominator is negative since a is a maximizer of n1: From the rst order
condition, we know that
(E(U 0F (a
)) =  E(U
0
D(a
))(E(UF (a)) + 2))
(E(UD(a)) + 1)
then,
@Q(a; k)
@k
ja=a=  (E(UF (a)) + 2))

@E(U 0D(a))
@k
  @E(UD(a))
@k
 E(U
0
D(a))
(E(UD(a)) + 1)

a=a
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I need to show that @Q(a;k)
@k
> 0 when a = abab:
Claim 2.1: E(U 0D(abab))  0:
Proof of Claim 2.1: When P employs a fully pooling strategy, Ds expected utility
from an agreement a is
E(UD(a)) = (1  jajk)

a+ 1
2

  1 (A3)
Suppose we were to maximize (A3) on [ 1; 1]. Note that for all a 2 ( 1; 0); E(UD(a)) <
E(UD( a)), thus (A3) cannot have a negative maximizer. Then maximizing (A3) is equiv-
alent to maximizing the following,
max
a2[0;1]
E(UD(a)) = (1  ak)

a+ 1
2

  1
This is a continuous, single-peaked function in a compact interval, thus it has a unique
maximizer. Let aD denote this maximizer, then aD solves the following rst order condition,
@E(UD(a))
@a
= 1  ak   kak   kak 1 = 0
When k = 1; the rst order condition implies a = 0: At a = 0; @
2E(UD(a))
@a2
 0, thus a = 0
is the unique maximizer when k = 1. When k > 1, @E(UD(a))
@a
is a continuous, and strictly
decreasing function on [0; 1]: It is positive at a = 0 and negative at a = 1. Thus, it is equal
to zero at a single point between 0 and 1; which means that, given k; aD is unique.
The maximization in (A2) can be rewritten as
max
a2[ 1;1]

1  a2
2

(E(UD(a)) + 1)
with the following rst order condition,
 a(E(UD(a) + 1) +

1  a2
2

(
@E(UD(a)
@a
) = 0 (A4)
At a = aD;
@E(UD(a))
@a
= 0; and thus (A4) evaluated at a = aD is equal to  aD(E(uD(aD)+1)
which is weakly less than zero, which implies abab  aD. Note that this inequality becomes
strict when k > 1: And, since abab  aD, E(U 0D(abab))  0. (End of Proof of Claim 2.1)
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Note that
(E(UF (abab)) + 2)) =
1  a2
2
 0 for all a 2 [0; 1]
and,
(E(UD(abab)) + 1) = (1  ak)

a+ 1
2

 0 for all a 2 [0; 1]:
Then,
@E(UD(a))
@k
ja=abab=  
abab + 1
2
 akbab  log(abab) > 0; since abab 2 [0; 1]
@E(U 0D(a))
@k
ja=abab=   log(abab)(akbab + kakbab + kak 1bab )  akbab   ak 1bab
Claim 2.2: k log aD <  1.
Proof of Claim 2.2: k log aD <  1 implies aD < e  1k : At aD = e  1k
@E(UD(a))
@a
= 1  e  1k (k)   ke  1k (k)   ke  1k (k 1) < 0
thus, aD < e 
1
k : (End of Proof of Claim 2.2)
Since, k log aD <  1 and, abab  aD; @E(U
0
D(a))
@k
ja=abab is positive. Thus if
@E(UD0(a))
@k
ja=abab>
@E(UD(a))
@k
ja=abab 
E(UD0(abab))
(E(UD(abab)) + 1)
then we can conclude that @abab
@k
> 0: Note that the above inequality implies
  log(abab)(kakbab + kak 1bab )  akbab   ak 1bab >
a2kbab log(abab) + ka
2k
bab log(abab) + ka
2k 1
bab log(abab)
1  abab
This inequality holds since k log abab <  1 (abab  aD < e  1k ) and 0 < 1   abab < 1; which
together imply that the left hand side is positive and the right hand side is negative.
Proof of Remark 1. Take any size one equilibrium and letM+ be the set of messages sent
with positive probability in that equilibrium. If M+ has only one element then this must
be a babbling equilibrium and we know in any babbling equilibrium the unique induced
agreement is abab. Let M+ contain n > 1 messages. Then it must be that (m) = a for all
m 2M+. Let p be the declaration strategy of P in this equilibrium. Then, P
m2M+
p(m; t) = 1,
for all t 2 T , p(m; t)  0; and R p(m; t)g(t)dt > 0, for all m 2M+: The belief that D and F
hold about ratiability of alternative agreements given p should be
(a;m) =
qR
d
v(a; t)p(m; t)g(t)dt
qR
d
p(m; t)g(t)dt
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and a maximizes (a;m)2[UD(a)  UD(q)][UF (a)  UF (q)]:
Let p0 be a declaration strategy in which each type sends each message inM+ with equal
probability. Then p0 is a babbling declaration strategy, and for each t 2 T; I can write
p0(m; t) =
X
m2M+
1
n
p(m; t)
and the belief that D and F hold about ratiability of alternative agreements given p0 should
be
0(a;m) =
qR
d
v(a; t)
 P
m2M+
1
n
p(m; t)

g(t)dt
qR
d
 P
m2M+
1
n
p(m; t)

g(t)dt
=
X
m2M+
qZ
d
v(a; t)p(m; t)g(t)dt =
X
m2M+
(a;m)cm
where 0  cm  1 is some constant for each m 2 M+: Since p0 is a babbling declaration
strategy, we know that in equilibrium, abab will be induced. That is, abab will maximize
0(a;m)2[UD(a)  UD(q)][UF (a)  UF (q)]
which can be rewritten as X
m2M+
(a;m) cm
!2
[UD(a)  UD(q)][UF (a)  UF (q)]
Note that each element of this summation is maximized at a which means their sum is also
maximized at a:. But we know the induced agreement in a babbling equilibrium is unique
and it is equal to abab: Thus, a = abab.
Proof of Lemma 1. After observing the message l, Ds expected utility from signing an
international agreement a becomes,
E(UD(a)) =
  jajk if a  2t  1
a+1
2t
(1  jajk)  1 if a  2t  1
and Fs expected utility of signing an international agreement a becomes,
E(UF (a)) =
 (a+ 1) if a  2t  1
a+1
2t
(1  a)  2 if a  2t  1
and thus, (l) solves,
max

max
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a); max
a2[ 1;2t 1]
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  jajk)

1  a2
2

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Let
n2(a) = (1  jajk)(1  a)
and
n3(a) =
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  jajk)

1  a2
2

Note that n2(2t  1) = n3(2t  1). Moreover, since t  12 ;
max
a2[ 1;2t 1]
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  jajk)

1  a2
2

= max
a2[ 1;2t 1]
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  ( a)k)

1  a2
2

with
@ 1
t
2
 
a+1
2

(1  ( a)k)

1 a2
2

@a
ja2[ 1;0]> 0
which means
argmax
a2[ 1;2t 1]
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  ( a)k)

1  a2
2

= 2t  1
Then,
max

max
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a); max
a2[ 1;2t 1]
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  jajk)

1  a2
2

= max

max
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a); (1  2t  1k)(1  (2t  1)) = max
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a)
For a 2 [2t  1; 0]; n2(a) = (1  ( a)k)(1  a) and,
@n2(a)
@a
=
@(1  ( a)k)(1  a)
@a
= k( a)k 1(1  a) + ( a)k   1
At a =  1; @n2(a)
@a
= 2k > 0; and a = 0; @n2(a)
@a
=  1. Moreover, @2n2(a)
@a2
< 0 for all a 2 [ 1; 0]:
Thus, @n2(a)
@a
must be equal to zero at exactly one point within [ 1; 0]:
For a  0; n2(a) = (1  ak)(1  a): This is a strictly decreasing function in a. Thus,
argmax
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a)
is unique and it is in [2t  1; 0]: In other words, (1  jajk)(1  a) is single peaked in [ 1; 1],
and its maximizer is in [ 1; 0]:
Proof of Lemma 2. After observing the message h, Ds expected utility from submitting
an international agreement a for ratication becomes
E(UD(a)) =
  1 if a  2t  1
 a+1 2t
2(1 t) jaj
k   1

1  a+1 2t
2(1 t)

if a  2t  1
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and Fs expected utility from signing an agreement a becomes
E(UF (a)) =
 2 if a  2t  1
 a+1 2t
2(1 t) (1 + a)  2

1  a+1 2t
2(1 t)

if a  2t  1
Since both F and D obtain higher expected utilities from an agreement a that satises
a  2t  1, we can characterize (h) as
(h) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  jajk) (4)
Let the objective function in (4) be denoted by n4(a), then,
@n4(a)
@a
=

a+ 1  2t
4(1  t)2

[2(1 a)(1 jajk) (a+1 2t)(1 jajk) k jajk 1 jaj
a
(1 a)(a+1 2t)]
@n4(a)
@a
ja=2t 1= 0 and
@2n4(a)
@a2
ja=2t 1> 0 =) a = 2t  1 is a minimum.
@n4(a)
@a
ja=1= 0 and @
2n4(a)
@a2
ja=1> 0 =) a = 1 is a minimum.
Since t < 1
2
, we have 2t   1 < 0. Moreover, @n4(a)
@a
> 0 for all a 2 (2t   1; 0), which implies
0  (h) < 1: For a = 0 to be feasible, it must be that t = 1
2
; but we know that 2t  1 is a
minimum, thus, we can conclude 0 < (h) < 1: Then, we can rewrite (h) as
(h) = argmax
a2[max(0;2t 1);1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak)

a+1 2t
2(1 t)
2
(1 a)(1 ak) is a continuous function and [max(0; 2t 1); 1] is a compact interval,
thus it has a maximum within this interval. Note that for a 2 [max(0; 2t  1); 1];
E(UD) =

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)

(1  ak)  1
This is a continuous, and strictly concave function. Similarly, for a 2 [max(0; 2t  1); 1];
E(UF ) =

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)

(1  a)  2
which, again, is a continuous and strictly concave function. Moreover, [max(0; 2t   1); 1] is
a convex set. Then, it must be that the Nash bargaining solution is unique. Moreover,
a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak) =

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)

(1  a)

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)

(1  ak)
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and this is the multiplication of two positive-valued functions that are single peaked in [0; 1],
which means that their product is also single peaked in [0; 1].
Proof of Proposition 7. Claim 7.1: (l) is weakly decreasing in k.
Proof of Claim 7.1:
(l) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a)
I have shown in the proof of Claim 1 that (1  jajk)(1  a) is single peaked in [ 1; 1]; and
its peak is in [ 1; 0] which means
max
a2[ 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a) = max
a2[ 1;0]
(1  ( a)k)(1  a)
Let a(k) = argmax
a2[ 1;0]
(1  ( a)k)(1  a), and let,
F (a; k) =
@(1  ( a)k)(1  a)
@a
= k( a)k 1(1  a) + ( a)k   1
Then F (a(k); k) = 0: Using the implicit function theorem,
@a(k)
@k
=  @F (a; k)=@k
F (a; k)=@a
ja=a(k)
=  

( a)k 1(1  a) + ( a)k 1(1  a)k log( a) + ( a)k log( a)
F (a; k)=@a

a=a(k)
The denominator is negative since a(k) is a maximum. The numerator is negative if
k log( a(k)) <  1 which implies a(k) >  e  1k :
F ( e  1k ; k) = (ke 1 kk + ke 1 + e 1   1)
Note that F ( e  1k ; k) > 0 for k = 1; and it is increasing in k which implies a(k) >  e  1k
for all k  1. Thus, the above numerator is negative and @a(k)
@k
< 0:
We know that a(k) = (l) if a(k) 2 [2t 1; 0], and that (l) = 2t 1 if a(k) < 2t 1:
Thus, for those k values for which a(k) 2 [2t  1; 0], (l) is strictly decreasing in k. Since
@a(k)
@k
< 0, given t; there exists k such that for all k > k, a(k) < 2t 1: Then, @(l)
@k
jk>k= 0:
Thus, @
(l)
@k
 0: (End of Proof of Claim 7.1)
Claim 7.2: (h) is increasing in k.
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Proof of Claim 7.2:
(h) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  jajk)
I have already proven (Proof of Claim 2) that this maximization problem has a unique,
nonnegative maximizer. Hence, we can write,
(h) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak)
Let
n5(a) =

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak)
and let F (a; k) = @n5(a)
@a
: Then, F ((h); k) = 0. We can use the implicit function theorem
to analyze @
(h)
@k
:
@(h)
@k
=  @F (a; k)=@k
@F (a; k)=@a
ja=(h)
=  

a+1 2t
2(1 t)2

ak log(a)(a+1 2t
2
  1 + a) +

a+1 2t
2(1 t)
2
ak 1(a  k log(a) + ka  1)
@F ((h); k)=@a
j
a=(h)
Claim 7.2.1: 
(h)+1 2t
2
  1 + (h)  0
Proof of Claim 7.2.1: Let
b(a) =

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)
and c(a) = (1   ak): Then, n5(a) = b(a)  c(a). Note that b(a) has a local maximum at
a = 1
3
+ 2
3
t; and that for all a > 1
3
+ 2
3
t, both b0(a) and c0(a) are negative. Thus, (h) cannot
be greater than 1
3
+ 2
3
t:
(h) + 1  2t
2
  1 + (h) = 3
(h)  1  2t
2
and 3
(h) 1 2t
2
 0 since (h)  1
3
+ 2
3
t: (End of Proof of Claim 7.2.1)
Claim 7.2.2: ((h)  k log((h)) + k(h)  1) > 0
Proof of Claim 7.2.2: For k = 1;
((h)  k log((h)) + k(h)  1) = (2(h)  log((h))  1)
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which is positive for all (h) 2 [0; 1]. Moreover,
@((h)  k log((h)) + k(h)  1)
@k
= (h)  log((h))
which is also positive for all (h) 2 [0; 1]. That is, the expression is increasing in k, which
means
((h)  k log((h)) + k(h)  1) > 0
for all k  1: (End of Proof of Claim 7.2.2)
Note that 
(h)+1 2t
2(1 t)2 > 0, and log(
(h)) < 0: Thus, the numerator of @
(h)
@k
is positive.
The denominator is negative since (h) is the maximizer of n5(a); which then imply
@(h)
@k
>
0: (End of Proof of Claim 7.2)
Claim 7.3: (h) is increasing in t:
Proof of Claim 7.3: To calculate @
(h)
@t
; we can again make use of the implicit func-
tion theorem and the rst order condition we have from the maximization of n5(a). Let
F (a; k; t) = @n5(a)
@a
: Then,
F (a; k; t) =
a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)2

(1  ak)(1  a)  a+ 1  2t
2
(1  ak + kak 1   kak)

and F ((h); k; t) = 0. Then, using the implicit function theorem,
@(h)
@t
=   @F (a; k; t)=@t
@F (a; k; t)=@a
ja=(h)
Let,
b(a; t) =
a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)2
and
c(a; t) =

(1  ak)(1  a)  a+ 1  2t
2
(1  ak + kak 1   kak)

Then, @F (a;k;t)
@t
= @b(a;t)
@t
c(a; t) + @c(a;t)
@t
b(a; t): Note that at a = (h);
c(a; t) =

(1  ak)(1  a)  a+ 1  2t
2
(1  ak + kak 1   kak)

= 0
from the rst order condition of the maximization of n5(a): So,
@F (a;k;t)
@t
= @c(a;t)
@t
b(a; t): And
@c(a; t)
@t
= (1  ak + kak 1   kak) > 0 for all, a 2 [0; 1]
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so it must be positive at a = (h): Since (h) > 2t   1; (h)+1 2t
2(1 t)2 is also positive Thus,
@F ((h); k)=@t > 0: We know that @F ((h); k)=@a < 0, since (h) is a maximum. Thus,
we can conclude that @
(h)
@t
> 0: (End of Proof of Claim 7.3)
We know that, given t 2 (0; 1
2
],
(h) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak)
When k = 1,
(h) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)2
and it solves the rst order condition
a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)2

(1  a)( 2a+ 2t) = 0
which implies (h) = t: And, as k increases innitely, (1  ak) converges to one and (h)
then maximizes

a+1 2t
2(1 t)
2
(1  a), which, as I have shown, is maximized at (h) = 1
3
+ 2
3
t:
Given that (h) is increasing in both k and t, it must be that (h) 2 [t; 1
3
+ 2
3
t]: We
also know that when k = 1; (l) = 0: Thus, when k = 1, the ratication game does not
have a size two equilibrium. Moreover, we know that @
(l)
@k
 0 and @(h)
@k
 0: Then, if
@(l)
@k
+ @
(h)
@k
< 0 we can conclude that our signaling game has no size two equilibrium.
Unfortunately it is not possible to evaluate these derivatives and reach a conclusion but
intuitively, one can expect @
(l)
@k
+ @
(h)
@k
to be smaller than zero since as (h) gets larger
it moves away from the ideal points of both negotiators and thus faces stronger resistance
whereas as (l) gets lower it gets closer to Fs ideal point.
Although we cannot evaluate the derivatives directly we can use the available information
to narrow down the parameter space in order to facilitate our search. First of all, note that
(l)+(h)
2
= t implies that at equilibrium (h) = 2t   (l): Given that (l) < 0 for all
k > 1, it must be that at equilibrium (h) > 2t: Since 1
3
+ 2
3
t is the highest value (h) can
take, we can conclude that there cannot be an equilibrium if 2t > 1
3
+ 2
3
t; that is, there can
only be an equilibrium if t  1
4
:
We know that at an equilibrium 
(l)+(h)
2
= t and that t > 0: Thus, there cannot
be an equilibrium if (l) + (h) < 0: We know the highest value (h) can attain is 1
2
in the parameter interval we are investigating. If (l) (which is negative and which can
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be calculated by going through the maximization of n2(a)) is smaller than  12 for some k
values within the k interval at hand, then we can exclude those k values as there can be no
equilibrium at those values. It can easily be shown that for all k  3:6; (l) <  1
2
: Thus,
in equilibrium it must be that k < 3:6: With some k values eliminated, we can go back and
recalculate the highest value (h) can get and eliminate those t values that exceed half
the highest value (h) can attain. Then we can eliminate again those k values for which
(l) is smaller than  (h): Iteratively we can eliminate k and t values in this fashion.
Appendix B contains the R code that does these iterations reducing the parameter space
which can harbor a size two equilibrium to t 2 (0; 0:001), and k 2 (1; 1:0008):It is possible
to continue and narrow down the parameter space further but the calculations are limited
by the precision limits of my computer and the marginal benet of continuing. I argue
that there is only size one equilibria in this signaling game and so it is not possible for the
legislature to convey information to the executive.
7 Appendix B: The code
m=1
h=seq(0,m,by=0.000001)
k=3.60000
t=0.250000
i=1
while (i<length(h)){
f=2*((h[i]+1-2*t)/((2-2*t)^2))*(1-h[i]^k)*(1-h[i])-(((h[i]+1-2*t)^2)/(2-2*t)^2)
*(h[i]^(k-1))*k*(1-h[i])-(((h[i]+1-2*t)^2)/(2-2*t)^2)*(1-h[i]^k)
if (f>0.000000)
i=i+1
else { cat(h=,, h[i],nn)
if (t>h[i]/2)
{t=h[i]/2
i=1 }
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else {cat(t=,,t,nn)
g=((2*t)^(k-1))*k*(1+(2*t))-1+((2*t)^k)
n=k
while (g<0 & k>=1){
n=n-0.000001
g=((2*t)^(n-1))*n*(1+(2*t))-1+((2*t)^n)}
n=n+0.000001
if (n<k)
{k=n
cat(k=,,k,nn)
i=1}
else
i=2000000 }}}
8 Appendix C: Costly signaling
I will not go into detailed formal derivations, and leave it to for future study, but we can
get an idea about possible results of costly signaling by a simple exercise which incorporates
costly signaling into the model in a theoretical fashion:
Letm(t) 2 [0; 1] be P 0s declaration at stage one, after P observes its type which is a draw
by Nature from its uniform distribution on the [0; 1] interval. But this time assume that
there is a cost associated with making a declaration and that the cost is m(t)
t
. Note that the
declaration cost varies with Ps type. Let a(t) be the agreement induced by a message sent
by a type t ratier. Then by incentive compatibility it must be that in equilibrium no type
t can obtain a strictly higher payo¤ by emulating the behavior of another type, say typet0.
Thus, in equilibrium, for any t; t 2 T the following inequalities must hold:
  ja(t)  tj   m(t)
t
   ja(t0)  tj   m(t
0)
t
  ja(t0)  t0j   m(t
0)
t0
   ja(t)  t0j   m(t)
t0
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Without loss of generality, assume t0 < t. Note that by incentive compatibility on the part of
the foreign and domestic executives it must be that a(t) < t and a(t0) < t0, and thus a(t0) < t
Since these inequalities must hold for any t; t0 2 T , let us take t0 such that a(t) < t0. Then
the above inequalities can be rewritten as:
 a(t) + t  m(t)
t
  a(t0) + t  m(t
0)
t
 a(t0) + t0   m(t
0)
t0
  a(t) + t0   m(t)
t0
Subtracting the RHS of the second inequality from the LHS of the rst, and the LHS of the
second from the RHS of the rst implies
m(t)  m(t0)
which means in any sequential equilibrium m(t) must be weakly monotone increasing in
t. This means for almost all t 2 T , either @m
@t
> 0 or @m
@t
= 0: 12In the former case, the
declaration by the ratier is separating, whereas in the second m(:) is a pooling strategy
since an interval of types send the same message. Thus, we can conclude that this costly
signaling game has pooling, semi-pooling, and separating equilibria. With an abundance of
equilibria, the question then becomes which ones should be relevant for us. Note that it
is possible to narrow down the set of possible equilibria by applying one of the equilibrium
renement concepts that are available in the theoretical literature (Banks, 2001). I also leave
such extensions for future studies.
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